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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
 
No. 10-3225 
Y. V. Z., 
                    Petitioner 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                          Respondent 
 
 
Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A088-013-426) 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES and COWEN, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 13, 2012 
 
(Opinion filed:  August 14, 2012) 
 
OPINION 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 Y. V. Z.1
                                              
1 By Order dated August 26, 2011, we granted Petitioner’s motion to file her Briefs, Joint 
Appendix  and other submissions under seal. 
 has filed a petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals  dismissing her appeal from an Immigration Judge’s denial of her applications 
for asylum, withholding of removal and relief under Article 3 of the Convention Against 
Torture (“CAT”).  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review. 
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I.   
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we need not set forth the factual or 
procedural history of this case.   
 Where, as here,  the BIA adopts the reasoning of the IJ and supplements it with 
reasoning of its own, this court reviews both decisions.  See Paripovic v. Gonzales, 418 
F.3d 240, 243 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005).  Factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence 
and are considered conclusive “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to 
conclude to the contrary.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).  Factual findings include, among 
other determinations, whether an applicant has suffered “persecution,” holds a “well-
founded” fear of future persecution, and has established that the past acts or future fears 
were or will be “on account of” a protected ground.  See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 
157, 167 & 173 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, with deference to the agency when 
implicating an ambiguous section of the Act.  See Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 
330, 339 (3d Cir. 2008).  “Whether an applicant’s proffered ‘particular social group’ is 
cognizable  under [the INA] is a question of law and is therefore subject to de novo 
review. . . . [But] [s]uch de novo review of  the BIA’s legal determinations is of course 
‘subject to established principles of deference’ set out in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).”  Id. (citations and footnote omitted).   
II.   
1. Asylum and withholding of removal. 
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 Section 208 of the INA gives the Attorney General discretion to grant asylum to 
removable aliens.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(a).  However, that relief can only be granted if the 
applicant is a “refugee.”  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b).  “[R]efugee” is defined as: 
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s 
nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is 
outside of any country in which such person last habitually 
resided, and who is unable or unwilling to avail himself or 
herself of the protection of that country because of 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account 
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion. 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).  Accordingly, an alien’s ability to establish that he or she is 
entitled to relief as a refugee turns on whether he or she can establish persecution “on 
account of” one of the five statutory grounds.  INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 
(1992).  The alien must also establish that “at least one central reason” for the 
“persecution” was or would be because of (i.e., “on account of”) one of the five protected 
grounds.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). 2
 An applicant who establishes past persecution is “entitled to a presumption that his 
life or freedom will be threatened if he returns.”  Gabuniya v. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 316, 
321 (3d Cir. 2006); see 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1).  Where an applicant is unable to 
demonstrate that he or she has been the victim of past persecution, the applicant 
nonetheless becomes eligible for asylum upon demonstrating a well-founded fear of 
future persecution if returned to his or her native country.  See Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 
 
                                              
2 The REAL ID Act, which applies to this case, supersedes the prior “at least in part” 
mixed-motive standard.  See Ndayshimiye v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 124, 129 (3d Cir. 
2009). 
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330 F.3d 587, 592 (3d Cir. 2003).  The well-founded fear of persecution standard 
involves both a subjectively genuine fear of persecution and an objectively reasonable 
possibility of persecution.  INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1987).  The 
subjective prong requires a showing that the fear is genuine.  Mitev v. INS, 67 F.3d 1325, 
1331 (7th Cir. 1995).  Determining whether the fear of persecution is objectively 
reasonable requires ascertaining whether a reasonable person in the alien’s circumstances 
would fear persecution if returned to a given country.  Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 
1065 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 If the persecution was not directly committed by the government or its agents, the 
petitioner must also establish that it was conducted “by forces the government is unable 
or unwilling to control.”  Kibinda v. Att’y Gen., 477 F.3d 113, 119 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 Withholding of removal is mandatory if “the Attorney General decides that [the] 
alien’s life or freedom would be threatened” on account of a protected ground.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1253(h)(1) (re-codified, as amended, at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)).  To qualify for 
withholding of removal, an alien must establish a “clear probability of persecution,” i.e., 
that it is more likely than not that he or she would suffer persecution upon returning 
home.  See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984).  Since this standard is more 
demanding than that governing eligibility for asylum, an alien who fails to qualify for 
asylum is necessarily ineligible for withholding of removal.  Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 
732, 738 (2d Cir. 1995). 
2.  Relief under the CAT. 
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 “An applicant for relief on the merits under [Article III] of the Convention Against 
Torture bears the burden of establishing ‘that it is more likely that not that he or she 
would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.”  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 
290 F.3d 166, 174-175 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting 8 C.F.R.§ 208.16(c)(2)).  “The United 
States Senate specified this standard, as well as many of the other standards that govern 
relief under the Convention, in several ‘understandings’ that it imposed on the United 
States’ ratification of the Convention Against Torture.”  Id. at 175 (citations omitted).  
“The standard for relief has no subjective component, but instead requires the alien to 
establish, by objective evidence, that he is entitled to relief.”  Id. (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The alien’s testimony, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain 
the burden of proof without corroboration.  Mansour v. INS, 230 F.3d 902, 907 (7th Cir. 
2000) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)).  If an alien meets his or her burden of proof, 
withholding of removal or deferring of removal is mandatory.   INA § 241(b)(3); 8 
C.F.R. §§ 208.16 – 208.18. 
 Under the implementing regulations for the Convention: 
Torture is defined as an act by which severe pain and 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him 
or her or a third person information or a confession, punishing 
him or her for an act he or she has committed or is suspected 
of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her 
or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of 
any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity. 
 
8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1). 
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 “[T]he regulations clearly state that there is no acquiescence to torture unless the 
relevant officials know about the torture before it occurs.”  Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 176 
(citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7)) (emphasis in original).  In Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y Gen., 
473 F.3d 58, 70 (3d Cir. 2007), we held that “acquiescence to torture [as used in the 
regulation] requires only that government officials remain willfully blind to torturous 
conduct and breach their legal responsibility to prevent it.”    
 The regulations also provide: 
(3) In assessing whether it is more likely than not that an 
applicant would be tortured in the proposed country of 
removal, all evidence relevant to the possibility of future 
torture shall be considered, including, but not limited to: 
(i) Evidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant; 
(ii) Evidence that the applicant could relocate to a part of the 
country of removal where he or she is not likely to be 
tortured; 
(iii) Evidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human 
rights with the country of removal, where applicable; and 
(iv) Other relevant information regarding conditions in the 
country of removal. 
 
8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3).  “[C]ountry conditions alone can play a decisive role [in 
determining if relief is warranted] . . . [and] the convention does not require that the 
prospective risk of torture be on account of certain protected grounds.”3
 “Torture is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment and does not include 
lesser forms of cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment that do not amount to 
  Kamalthas v. 
INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1280 (9th Cir. 2001). 
                                              
3 Because the risk of torture does not need to be on account of certain protected grounds, 
“the inability to state a cognizable asylum claim does not necessarily preclude relief 
under the [CAT].”  Kamalthas, 251 F.3d at 1280. 
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torture.”  8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(2).  Therefore, “even cruel and inhuman behavior by 
government officials may not implicate the torture regulations.”  Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 
175.  “[T]orture covers intentional governmental acts, not negligent acts or acts by 
private individuals not acting on behalf of the government.”  In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 
291, 299 (BIA 2002).  The BIA has also held that “[v]iolence committed by individuals 
over whom the government has no reasonable control does not implicate” relief under the 
CAT.  In re Y-L-, A-G-, R-S-R-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 280 (BIA 2002).  Similarly: 
[T]he existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant, or 
mass violations of human rights in a particular country does 
not, as such, constitute a sufficient ground for determining 
that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected 
to torture upon his or her return to that country.  Specific 
grounds must exist that indicate the individual would be 
personally at risk. 
 
In re S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306, 1313 (BIA 2000).   
III.   
 Y.V.Z. makes a number of arguments in support of her petition for review.  Each 
is considered separately below. 
1. Y.V.Z. suffered persecution at the hands of Huamani and has a  
well-founded fear of persecution at his hands “on account of” 
of her membership in her two proposed social groups, both 
of which have “social visibility.” 
  
  Y.V.Z. contended that she was persecuted by Huamani and had a well-founded 
fear of future persecution by him “on account of” her membership in two proposed 
“particular social group[s],” viz., “women in Peru who are in relationships that they are 
unable to leave” and “Peruvian women who complain of gender-based violence.”  As 
8 
 
further noted, both the IJ and the BIA held, inter alia, that the two proposed social groups  
were not cognizable under the INA because they lacked “social visibility.”  In this 
portion of her petition, Y.V.Z. argues that her proposed social groups have “social 
visibility” and that she suffered past persecution and has a well-founded fear of future 
persecution “on account of” her membership in both social groups. 
 This petition was originally listed for disposition for October 3, 2011.  However, 
we held the petition CAV pending our decision in Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney 
General of the United States, No. 08-4564.  That case has since been decided.  See 
Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney General of the United States (“Valdiviezo-Galdamez 
II”), 663 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2011).    
 There, we discussed at length the BIA’s initial interpretation of the term 
“particular social group” and its later development of the requirement of  “social 
visibility” for determining whether a proposed social group constitutes a “particular 
social group” for purposes of asylum and withholding of removal under the INA.  We 
held that the BIA’s requirement of “social visibility” which was applied in denying 
Valdiviezo-Galdamez’s applications for relief -- and which was applied in denying 
Y.V.Z.’s applications for relief -- was not entitled to deference under the standards 
established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984), because it was inconsistent with a number of cases in which the BIA had 
found that a proposed social group was a “particular social group” under the standard it 
had earlier established in Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985), overruled on 
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other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).  Valdiviezo-
Galdamez II, 663 F.3d at 603-07.   
 Although the BIA can certainly change the requirements for establishing 
membership in a “particular social group,” we explained in Valdiviezo-Galdamez II that 
the BIA must “announce[] a principled reason” for departing from established precedent, 
and that it had not done so in denying Valdiviezo-Galdamez’s claim that young men 
resisting recruitment into a criminal gang could constitute a particular social group for 
purposes of establishing refugee status.  Id. at 608.  We held that, unless or until the BIA 
provides a “principled reason” for its departure from established precedent, its prior 
ruling in Matter of Acosta should control inquiries into whether an asylum applicant’s 
proposed social group constitutes a “particular social group” under the Act.  Id.4
 Here, although both the IJ and the BIA held that the two social groups proposed by 
Y.V.Z. lacked “social visibility,” Valdiviezo-Galdamez II does not require us to remand 
Y.V.Z.’s petition to the BIA because of the BIA’s alternate holding that Y.V.Z. did not 
show that at least one central reason for the mistreatment she suffered at Huamani’s 
hands, or her fear of future mistreatment by Huamani, was because of a protected ground, 
  We 
therefore granted Valdiviezo-Galdamez’s petition for review and remanded it to the BIA 
to analyze his proposed social group in a manner consistent with our holding in 
Valdiviezo-Galdamez II.  Id. at 608-09. 
                                              
4 We also noted in Valdiviezo-Galdamez II that the “BIA must not only announce a 
‘principled reason’ for any changes it makes to its definition of ‘particular social group,” 
any announced changes must be based on a permissible construction of the statute.”  663 
F.3d at 609 n.19. 
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i.e., her inclusion in a “particular social group.”  We agree with the BIA that the record c 
shows that Y.V.Z. was mistreated by Huamani not because of her membership in a social 
group, but rather because of  “purely personal reasons,” viz., his personal, aberrant desire 
to become Y.V.Z.’s boyfriend.   
2.  Y.V.Z. faces persecution by Huamani on account 
of her political opinion that she deserves to  
be free from violence and harm. 
 
 Y.V.Z. argues that the IJ and the BIA erred in holding that she was not persecuted 
by Huamani on account of her political opinion, viz., her opinion that she deserves to be 
free from harm and violence.  She further argues that Huamani imputed that political 
opinion to her.   
 In order to prevail on an asylum or withholding of removal claim based on 
political opinion, “an alien must (1) specify the political opinion on which he or she 
relies, (2) show that he or she holds that opinion, and (3) show that he or she would be 
persecuted or has a well-founded fear of persecution based on that opinion.”  Fatin v. 
INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993).  “[P]ersecution may be on account of a political 
opinion the applicant actually  holds or on account of one the [persecutor] has imputed to 
him.”  Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 181.  “In determining whether an asylum applicant was 
persecuted because of an imputed political opinion, we focus on whether the persecutor 
attributed a political opinion to the victim, and acted upon the attribution.”  Espinosa-
Cortez v. Att’y Gen., 607 F.3d 101, 108 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  “This focus on whether the persecutor (or would-be persecutor) 
attributes a political view to the victim makes clear that the INA makes motive critical 
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and an asylum applicant must provide some evidence of motive, direct or circumstantial.”  
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).    
 Even if we assume for argument’s sake that Y.V.Z.’s desire to be free from harm 
and violence is an expression of a political opinion, there is no evidence in this record to 
show that Huamani knew of that political opinion.  Holding a political opinion, without 
more, is not sufficient to show persecution on account of that political opinion.  Mendez-
Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2010).  There must be evidence that 
Huamani knew of Y.V.Z.’s political opinion and that he targeted her because of it.  Id.  
As we have said, there is no evidence that Huamani knew about Y.V.Z.’s assumed 
political opinion or that he targeted her because of it.  Rather, as noted above, Huamani 
mistreated Y.V.Z. for purely personal reasons, viz.. his desire to be her boyfriend. 
3.  Y.V.Z. is entitled to relief under the CAT. 
 
Y.V.Z. argues that the IJ and the BIA erred by holding that she has not established 
that she has been or would likely be tortured by Huamani by or with the acquiescence of 
a government official.  Her argument is based on her contention that even after she made 
a report to the police about Huamani’s actions towards her, he continued to threaten, 
taunt and inflict violence on her. In her view, that constitutes “willful blindness” on the 
government’s part.  We disagree.   
 In Valdiviezo-Galdamez II, Valdiviezo-Galdamez filed five police reports about 
the criminal gang’s violent efforts to recruit him, with no tangible results.  663 F.3d at 
610.  We noted that the BIA found that a lack of tangible results  after the filing of the 
five reports was insufficient to show that the government was willfully blind or 
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acquiesced to the criminal gang’s activities.  Id.  We also held that the BIA’s conclusion 
was a reasonable inference that could be drawn from the record.  Id. 
 Thus, it is clear that failure to act on a single police report cannot rise to the kind 
of  governmental acquiescence of willful blindness that is needed to support a claim 
under the CAT. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 For all of the above reasons, we will deny the petition for review.   
 
